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1 Evolution of UK Policy on
Programme Aid since in the 1980s
The Overseas Development Administration (ODA)
was the first European donor to link its programme
aid to economic reform conditions in the early
1980s. Its approach to the management of pro-
gramme aid continuously evolved and by the mid
1990s its focus has shifted away from a balance of
payments approach towards a budgetary approach
to the management of programme aid. The opera-
tional and political implications of this latest policy
are examined here as well as implications for future
evaluation work. Trends in the volume and distrib-
ution of UK programme aid are shown in Table 1.
There have been broadly three phases in ODAS
programme aid policy and modalities. The first
(1983-87) was when this aid was linked to reform
but the focus was on direct control of the distribu-
tion of the imports locally. The second (1987 to
1994) was the period of increased economic and
procedural liberalization. The ODA is now entering
a third phase (from 1995). Macroeconomic reform
is still its main objective but it now favours interac-
tion between the donor community as a whole and
the recipient in relation to counterpart budgetary
funds. The stress is now on improved total public
expenditure priorities, processes and accountability
Phase I: Assistance Linked to
Economic Reform (1983-87)
By the early 1980s, ODA and its advisers were
becoming highly concerned with the deteriorating
macroeconomic environment and distorted pricing
systems and state inefficiencies in many of its aid
recipients. Till then programme aid had been used
little and unconditionally The emergence of seri-
ous balance of payments problems in a range of
recipients - especially in Africa - lead to a policy
of increased programme aid.
Programme aid had two major objectives: to help
achieve economic reform and to provide funds to
relieve a foreign exchange constraint. These funds
were linked to macroeconomic policy reforms
being negotiated by the IMF and the World Bank
with its main recipients. The policy shift towards
conditional programme aid was consistent with the
Conservative government's approach to its domes-
tic economy where it had embarked on tough sta-
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bilization measures and market-oriented reforms
after 1979. The standard approach ultimately
emerged as one in which the recipient country was
required to have an agreement, and therefore some
seal of approval, from the IMP This was normally a
SAF or ESAF covering stabilization objectives. ODA
usually made the release of each tranche of its own
import funding conditional on compliance with the
agreement with the IMP Occasionally, ODA has
linked its import finance with a World Bank agree-
ment on reform. Some variations on this main
model occurred in which the ODA moved before a
negotiated agreement by the World Bank (e.g.
Mozambique, 1985-6). Although ODA was the first
donor in Europe to link its programme aid with
IMF and World Bank negotiations on macroeco-
nomic and structural reform, nevertheless this poi-
icy emerged fairly cautiously
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The second related objective was that the flows of
funds should meet short-term balance of payments
problems. The ex-ante balance of payments gap
was estimated on the basis of how much aid was
necessary for recurrent imports to maintain the
domestic economy and assist it to grow at a rea-
sonable rate after allowing for export earnings net
of debt service ad the availability of finance for
projects. Hence the stress was on rapid disburse-
ment of funds and on maintenance imports, raw
materials, etc. The purpose was primarily to
increase utilization of capacity quickly Programme
aid was largely tied to procurement in the UK and
there was to be micro-appraisal of local end-users
of these general import funds.
ODA did not link counterpart funds from its pro-
gramme aid to expenditure on specific uses. The
Table 1 UK Bilateral Programme and Main Recipients
Notes: Figures exclude debt relief which was under £m in total except for 199394.
Disbursement figures rounded to nearest £m; ... denotes negligible and none.
Source: British Aid Statistics
1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95
Total £m (all countries) 134 162 152 119 138 122 116
At 199293 prices 163 199 162 125 142 120 112
Share of bilateral aid (per
cent) of which to
16 18 15 12 13 11 10
Sub-Saharan Africa 96 137 134 69 101 108 103
Ghana 24 19 12 12 10 5
Kenya 10 10 4
Malawi 10 10 10 20
Mozambique 18 9 14 5 10 9 10
Nigeria 59 25 3
Tanzania 20 5 21 11 7 10
Uganda 6 12 14 13 18 21 20
Zambia 30 13 28 25 25
Zimbabwe 1 8 23 15 15
South Asia 25 18 8 42 32 3 2
Bangladesh 25 18 8 2 12 3 2
India 40 20 -
UK has always opposed the hypothecation of coun-
terpart funds to specific project uses on the main
ground that it would fragment the budget manage-
ment process in the recipient country For each
donor to 'protect their projects' as islands of excel-
lence was seen as conflicting with an overall
attempt to decide budget priorities in constrained
financial situations. If any donor-supported project
was already included in an agreed list of public
expenditure priorities, its counterpart tying condi-
tions were unnecessary If these funds were tied to a
project outside the budget then it risked distorting
overall priorities, breaching public expenditure lim-
its and perhaps creating inflation where counterpart
funds were very large.
Phase Il: Liberalization and SPA
Coordination (1987-94)
The period after 1987 marked two changes in
British policy and management. First, ODA became
a founding member of the Special Programme for
Africa (SPA). It began playing a role within it to
establish a multi-donor collegiate approach to
strengthen the policy reforms being negotiated by
the World Bank and to establish common proce-
dures. It is therefore difficult to separate the ODAS
own perspectives from those developing within the
SPA framework after this time.
Second, policy for programme aid was reappraised
after 1987. ODA saw the contradiction between on
the one hand, the policy liberalization objectives of
programme aid and actual liberalization of local
markets, and on the other hand the policy of tying
aid to UK procurement, controlling (administra-
tively) the allocation of the imports to chosen local
end-users and using agents to control directly pro-
curement. Hence, a 'lighter hand' approach was
introduced in 1987 by which UK programme funds
were increasingly untied, and provided through lib-
eralized foreign exchange markets without donor
control over the local allocation. Negative rather
than positive lists of eligible imports were intro-
duced and reimbursement (retrospective) of local
importers who had successfully bid for currency for
imports in these auctions or markets.
Liberalized foreign exchange markets were seen as
allowing the highest local bidder and those with
adequate domestic currency to obtain the scarce
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foreign exchange at the more competitive exchange
rates that began to prevail. Combined with liberal-
ized product markets (also supported by reform
linked to assistance) the rationale of the new policy
was that any end-user who could obtain domestic
funds and could afford to pay the higher price for
imports in competition, must represent the higher
priority user. This followed because the user would
have to sell his products in the local market at a
price which would cover his input cost without out
an implicit or explicit subsidy from the state. There
remained a preference to target private rather than
public sector users, though funds were provided to
commercial parastatal agencies.
Accountability for programme aid which basically
had resided in judgements on the efficiency of allo-
cation of funds to local end-users (ex-ante and ex-
post) now shifted to the effectiveness of operation of
the foreign exchange market or surrogate market
mechanisms in the recipient countries; a shift from
assessment of individual user to assessment of insti-
tutional mechanism.
The modalities (as distinguished from policy) for
programme aid relate to allocation of the funds
domestically, the procurement procedures and value
for money, speed of disbursement and recovery of
counterpart funds. Initially ODA allocated funds in
tightly administered systems managed by itself and
its agents with positive lists and specified end users.
However, as countries liberalized their foreign
exchange systems it liberalized its own controls and
left more choices to the users in the foreign
exchange markets through which programme aid
was later channelled. ODA has progressively moved
from tying procurement to the UK towards a more
effectively untied use of programme aid. In Ghana,
Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia in the period 1989-
1993, it is estimated that 67 per cent of programme
aid was untied It is currently 75 per cent untied
within the SPA. lt used various devices to achieve for
value for money (in price and quality) by local users
(NAO, 1994) although its actual achievement of this
objective does not emerge very clearly from reviews.
Speedy disbursement of funds - an important objec-
tive -seems to have been reasonably achieved. The
average time-lag was 4.4 months for Ghana, Nigeria,
Tanzania and Zambia (NAO 1994). ODA expected
counterpart funds to be collected either directly by
the public sector or by sales to the private sector and
it sought to monitor their recovery ODA did not set
'use condition' for counterpart funds and so this was
intentionally not monitored.
An Assessment of ODAs Approach
in the 1980s (Phases I and II)
Four main criteria can be used to judge donor per-
formance on programme aid management. First,
whether it made its programme aid provision
depend on a satisfactory domestic economic policy
environment or at least evidence of satisfactory
progress in economic policy reform (ie a stable
macroeconomic situation and a fairly competitive
market environment). Given the fungibility of this
type of aid particularly when channelled through
foreign exchange market type mechanisms, it was
important to have some assurance of allocation to
the most economically efficient users. Second, how
adequately did it respond to changing conditions in
recipient countries in the use of the instrument?
Third, did the operational procedures ensure speed
of disbursement, best possible value for money and
distribution of funds to the most efficient or com-
petitive users and flexibility in responding to chang-
ing conditions? Fourth, did the donor work
towards maximum coordination among donors?
On the first criterion one possible (retrospective) test
of its performance on 'eligibility' is to relate its coun-
try distribution to some judgements on these coun-
tries' base state of macroeconomic policy, the degree
of improvement in these and the degree of state
intervention. Table 2 attempts to do this for the
periods 1988-90 and 199 1-3 for UK programme aid
and for comparison; the pattern of programme aid
financing by Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands
and the European Commission are included.
The judgements on each recipient's macro and
microeconomic policy stance and degree of adjust-
ment, are based on those provided in the World Bank
study, Adjustment in Africa (1994). Macroeconomic
policy assessments used indicators of fiscal balance,
monetary policy, real interest rates, inflation as well
as exchange rate policies and measures of competi-
tiveness. In addition indicators of the degree of state
intervention are also recorded. Of course, allowance
must be made for some subjectiveness in these
judgements and also for lags between decisions to
provide finance and actual disbursement.
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The record suggests that of the ten countries to which
ODA provided most of its programme aid (1988-93),
five were countries whose macroeconomic stance
had improved in the 1980s and was adequate in
1991 (Ghana, Gambia, Malawi, Kenya and Uganda)
and two were countries who had improved even if
their stance in 1991 was not adequate (Tanzania and
Zimbabwe). These countries also had a medium or
limited degree of state interference by the end of the
period covered. Major price distortions had been
removed and a unified foreign exchange market
established in all these countries except Kenya and
Zimbabwe. ODA also provided substantial pro-
gramme funding to Zambia where macroeconomic
policies were deteriorating in the 1980s and where
the position was inadequate in 1990-1 although it
did not provide these funds until there was an agreed
IMF programme of reform. Of course, Mozambique
was starting from a particularly retarded economic
environment while in the case of Zambia there was a
change of government in 1991 which gave prospects
of new commitment to economic change. In the case
of Nigeria, in retrospect ODA hardly backed a 'win-
ner' though it dïd stop aiding Nigeria when its
reforms went off course in 1991.
By comparison the European Commission import
assistance during this period seems to have been
fairly undiscriminating between those economies
which were deteriorating and those which were
improving. Its pattern remains the same in the early
1990s. German assistance also seems to have been
sprinkled widely with limited regard to policy per-
formance of recipients.
On the second criterion, the UK did show consid-
erable sensitivity to changing conditions in the
recipient countries over this period and manifested
considerable flexibility in its approach to policy
reform and in the modalities . This was indicated by
an early willingness to liberalize its own procedures
as recipient governments liberalized theirs.
Third, in terms of modalities, ODAS strengths were
flexibility in response to changing local conditions
and speed of disbursement in at least some of its
major recipients. Whether it achieved value for
money does not emerge clearly There was however, a
curious lack of attention to the actual recovery of
counterpart funds; either the receipt of these funds or
their transfer to national treasuries (NAO 1994: 3.21).
Fourth, ODA has showed a strong desire to achieve
a multilateral framework for management of struc-
tural adjustment assistance for Africa especially
through the SPA where it has made a major contri-
bution especially in helping to develop policy and
procedural guidelines for all donors to follow. At the
same time the ODAS individual role in the diagno-
sis, formulation and negotiation of the new eco-
nomic policy reforms has evolved. ODAS input
originally was an indirect one; through the UK
Treasury and Bank of England staff in the IMF and
World Bank Boards, where the UK was an influen-
tial and well informed member on adjustment po1-
icy issues. However, by the end of the 1980s it
achieved increased participation mainly through its
advisers participating in joint recipient country mis-
sions of diagnosis and review with the World Bank
staff. The British High Commission and ODAS
Development Divisions have also played some part
in seeking to dialogue directly on the recipient gov-
ernment's choice of policy options.
3 UK Policy in the 1990s: New
Orientations
UK policy entered a third phase in its approach
from about 1991. New objectives were added to
existing ones and there was a shift from a balance of
payments approach to a budgetary approach to the
management of programme aid funds.
Phase III (1991-95) Objectives
The main objective in the use of programme aid
continues to be its link to macroeconomic reform
and conditionality remains a strong feature in the
1990s. Programme aid is normally provided only if
a country has a seal of approval from the IMF on its
macroeconomic policy The disbursement of funds
is normally timed and tranched to coincide with
agreed 'milestones' under these IMF programmes.
ODA makes its own judgement on the adequacy of
the recipient's performance in achieving economic
reforms which are seen as the basis for long-term
growth. ODA has in practice held up release of its
programme aid - temporarily or permanently - if
agreed reforms are off-track (e.g. Zambia in 1991).
The World Bank also will not normally go ahead in
its structural adjustment financing and reform pro-
grammes without an IMF agreement. So the linking
of UK programme to a World Bank structural
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otes: O
 = no assistance = not available * countries where the donor's aid is a significant share of its exports (5%). Degree of state
intervention in m
arkets is ranked High(h) Medium(m) or Low(I) for 1992
Figures for CEU 198590 and 19913 are for 'Decisions'. Figures for G
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ents and there is therefore som
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risk therefore that disbursem
ents 19913 partly reflect decisions in the earlier period. G
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acro policies in
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ent but poor policies in 1990-91; and G
roup 3 had deteriorating
policies in 1986-91 and poor policies in 1990-91.
Sources: Aid statistics: CEU, 1993, Inform
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o, Annex 4; 1995, Review of Aid; 1993 Financial Cooperation under Lom
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any:
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. UK: British Aid Statistics. For Denm
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Table 2 Donor im
port assistance and the m
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ic policies of ACP recipient countries
adjustment programme also meets this minimal
condition. The UK however, does not normally seek
to add its own conditions to those of the World
Bank though there are some cases of this.
Since 1990 the UK has taken a strong position on
'good governance' and political and human rights
records. Thus it suspended tranches of programme
aid also for non-economic reasons, for example in
Malawi in 1992. Eligibility for UK programme aid
therefore now depends on performance in both
economic policy and good governance although
this approach has tended to apply mainly in Africa
where the higher degree of aid dependence has
probably made it possible there.
Although the overall volume of UK programme aid
has already peaked (see Table 1), flows will con-
tinue to be maintained at a substántial level. These
flows are fairly modest compared to those of the
European Commission and Japan. The main focus
geographically will be promotion of economic
reform and longer term economic growth in the
poorest countries especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Programme aid to Asia is being phased out.
The Shift from Balance of Payment
to a Budgetary Approach
In its management of the flow of funds, the UK has
shifted from a focus on the recipient's balance of
payments to its budgetary process. The focus of
accountability is no longer on imports and how
they are allocated and disbursed but on public
expenditure - its control and its structure, includ-
ing allocation. The counterpart funds from balance
of payments support which continues to be quick
disbursing, are used by ODA to reimburse elements
in the recipient's budget such as a sector like health
or education. To permit flexible use of these funds
in a budgetary context ODA has moved towards a
high degree of procurement untying; 75 per cent is
now untied within the SPA framework.
The link between programme aid and specific sec-
tors or sub-sectors of a recipient government's bud-
get is seen by ODA primarily in terms of
'accountability' and not 'conditionality'.
Accountability for the expenditure of the funds for
certain purposes does not achieve any change in the
allocation of budgetary expenditure by itself.
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UK programme aid provision is linked to World
Bank macroeconomic conditions and there are
often statements of intent on the shares of the bud-
get to be devoted to certain (usually social) sectors.
While IFI agreements do not usually focus on
reforms in the specific sectors concerned neverthe-
less the counterpart funds from the UK programme
aid does under-pin reforms in broad budget alloca-
tions to which the recipient has committed itself
through the public expenditure review process.
ODA then sees itself as supporting priority pro-
grammes like primary health and education within
this general framework.
However, ODA will sometimes add its own sector
(budget) conditions to those being negotiated by the
IFIs on more general economic policy Thus in its
recent programme aid agreement with Zambia for
the health sector it required, additional to World
Bank conditions, that in the event of a reduction of
the total budget for the health sector, ODA would
withdraw its support if the non-wage element of the
budget were reduced disproportionately lt also pur-
sues institutional reform through technical assistance
in the same sectors. Its approach makes institutional
reform and technical cooperation an integral part of
a package with programme aid (e.g. programme aid
for the health sector plus TC to assist public sector
financial management in Zambia recently).
ODAS ultimate objective for the management of pro-
gramme aid is a collective and disciplined donor
approach to the budget as a whole which is so often
heavily financed by the counterpart funds from pro-
gramme aid (and other aid forms) of all donors. ODA
sees the need for a medium-term framework of pub-
lic expenditure by recipient governments to be the
basis for dialogue and agreement with donors collec-
tively This would cover budget size, deficit and its
financing, its structure and sectoral allocations as well
as the balance between different budgetary elements
including capital, recurrent, wage and non-wage
expenditure. Donors would agree on priorities for the
allocation and use of public expenditure as a whole
which would be negotiated with the recipient author-
ities. The recipient authorities could put forward dif-
ferent priorities for donor dialogue. Consistency in
key priorities could be achieved by avoiding different
donors giving the recipient inconsistent messages and
priorities through earmarking to specific projects,
sometimes outside the budget framework.
lt wants to focus on what the recipient government
does and not just the donors. 'Ownership' of bud-
getary operations by the recipient government is
seen as essential; and forms part of its political
'good governance' strategy as well as its economic
development strategy. Recipient commitment to
institutional improvement in the budgetary man-
agement process is anticipated. The conditionality
would be relaxed as accountability improves.
ODA is not alone in the pursuit of these objectives.
The European Commission, for example, now has a
budgetary approach to programme aid in countries
where the foreign exchange system has been liber-
alized. Moreover the SPA has just agreed guidelines
on how policy dialogue should be conducted
within a medium term public expenditure frame-
work. A multi-year Action Programme to improve
standards of recipient budgetary management has
been proposed. Recipient transparency and partic-
ipation in the pursuit of priorities is sought. A
framework for donor coordination is to be estab-
lished by the recipient government. Expenditure
priorities are to be agreed with the donors. Progress
is to be monitored. There is a wish to see a country's
performance in this respect as a major considera-
tion in the future allocation of donor's aid.
Assessment of this Medium-Term
Budgetary Approach
What is the justification for the switch from a bal-
ance of payments\import allocation approach to
one managed through the budget of the recipient
country ? The rationale for a budgetary focus for
programme aid can be seen to rest basically on four
major considerations.
First, general purpose support can be said to relieve
a 'budget (or savings) constraint' as well as a 'foreign
exchange constraint' though under flexible
exchange rate and price systems the distinction dis-
appears. The bulk of the concessionality of pro-
gramme aid (which usually has a high grant
element in Africa), is now effectively transferred to
the government budget not to the private sector.
Currently private users purchase these funds in
now liberalized foreign exchange markets and they
pay in local currency to the Central Bank up-front.
This ensures a high degree of recovery of the coun-
terpart funds by the government.
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Second, foreign exchange and product markets are
now fairly liberalized so that allocation of foreign
exchange between users should be fairly efficient in
economic terms. At the same time, control of the
government's budget and the character of the bud-
getary process remains a major weakness in a num-
ber of recipient countries. Control of public
expenditure is a vital element in economic sta'biliza-
tion and control of inflation. Budgetary allocations
are frequently unbalanced both in relation to capi-
tal and recurrent expenditure, new investment and
maintenance, wage and non-wage elements.
The third major defence of this approach which can
focus on improvement of the budgetary process, is
that it aims to make the recipient government
account for its own spending rather than the donor
seeking to do so, as in the past. It integrates present
concerns with 'good governance' with the objectives
of better economic policies. The budgetary
processes lack accountability. It is therefore appro-
priate to focus on institutional aspects and ways in
which donors can help improve it alongside their
budgetary funding. Institutionally it must be easier
to appraise and dialogue on the allocation of public
expenditure through centralized institutions than to
do so on the allocation of imports in a private econ-
omy as in the past. Also it is probably easier techni-
cally to assess an ex ante budget deficit than an ex
ante balance of payments 'gap' for example.
Fourth, for those who would like to see greater con-
cern with poverty reduction in the aid process,
there is scope for of this objective within a wider
than project-by-project framework of dialogue and
financing in this 'global' public expenditure
approach.
Finally, a number of donors have tended to be resis-
tant to a budgetary approach to general purpose
aid. The main concern has been a fear of an 'open-
ended' commitment to support a recurrent budget.
This is understandable. Yet, there is a paradox here,
since the same donors have been prepared during
the 1980s to provide quick-disbursing balance of
payments support which (through counterpart
funds) has permitted in effect, recurrent budgetary
expenditure. Aid for recurrent imports for the econ-
omy during the 1980s also risked generating 'aid
dependence' as much as aid for recurrent budget
support. The aim in both cases is to phase-out such
support so the recurrent budget can become self-
supporting and aid can once again be channelled
largely into capital expenditure.
The management systems for programme aid envis-
aged also have considerable virtues. They aim for a
shift away from short term perspectives towards
medium term objectives, monitoring and condition-
ality The new approach seeks greater consistency in
priorities among donors and addresses the 'fungibil-
ity' issue. The ultimate and desirable goal is to reduce
the compartmentalization of aid in different instru-
ments towards management of transfers as a whole.
However, the shift towards a medium term
approach as yet does not imply a longer term donor
commitment of programme aid (tied to macro pol-
icy reform conditions) although currently sector
and project aid works largely does. Moreover, the
transition process towards these desirable goals of a
medium-term public expenditure framework with
coordinated donor agreement on priorities, does
pose some potential problems and dangers. The
approach will only work properly when the bud-
getary management procedures of recipients have
improved considerably At present the proposed
indicators and measures of recipient performance
appear to be its budgetary intentions or public
expenditure estimates. The ultimate need (for recip-
ient and donor) is to judge the expenditure out-
comes (which in many countries are only available
tardily and which often greatly diverge from autho
rizations and estimates). In addition of course more
feedback will be necessary (and indeed is proposed)
on the societal impact and productivity of budget
expenditures. This will be a substantially long-term
task. Maintaining support from donors' domestic
stakeholders in such a transition may not be easy
Another apparent inconsistency is that ODA (and
EC) are currently linking the counterpart of their
programme funding to specific budgetary expendi-
tures mainly in the social sectors. While accountabil-
ity for funds along these lines is quite acceptable
there are some signs that they are (both) also seeking
individually some leverage in restructuring the bud-
get towards certain sectors and sub sectors (eg edu-
cation, health, primary education and health etc); a
procedure which is best achieved collectively There
is some risk of a proliferation of donors all centring
on the same priority sectors and perhaps distorting
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the allocation process. There is also a risk that if the
macro-economic and structural reforms negotiated
with the IFIs (to which programme aid is primarily
linked ) are 'on course', the recipient may give little
attention to budgetary issues, corruption, etc.
5 Future Evaluation
In commissioning evaluation work in the period
between 1988 and 1991, ODA was concerned
above all with the design of the implementation of
their programmes. They were concerned with
modalities or implementation procedures and how
far these responded to changing objectives, includ-
ing micro economic allocation, though this did not
include the economic performance or outputs of
the end-users. However, ODA has relied on the
World Bank and the IMF to assess compliance with
their negotiated agreements. They did not cover the
impact of actual policy reform on the economies
(macroeconomic and microeconomic). But they
have encouraged the IFIs to undertake their own
evaluations of the impact of economic reforms.
1f programme aid continues to be linked with
macroeconomic reform and donors focus collec-
tively on budgetary management of the flow of
funds, what are the implications for evaluation
work in future? There is a strong case for macro-
economic policy change sought from aid interven-
tions to be evaluated from a multi-donor
perspective. While it is not sufficient to leave these
assessments to the IFIs alone, there is also little
point in each individual donor seeking to evaluate
its own impact, as the EC has done in assessing the
budget restructuring impact of its own structural
adjustment (see Caputo, 1996). Combined donor
encouragement of independent evaluation of total
donor impact of this kind seems justified.
With a shift in focus onto the budgetary aspects,
donors are or will be, concerned with the impact of
their 'budgetary' aid. This covers the impact of aid
flows on 'additional public expenditure' and
'reduced domestic resource mobilization' as well as
the impact on restructuring or reallocation of pub-
lic expenditure. These aspects are appropriate for
evaluation work. This work should cover not just
the medium-term outcomes stemming from this
approach but also its impact on income, health,
education, etc. and the distributional effects.
Finally, institutional changes in the budgetary
process and the extent to which accountability
improves are suitable for evaluation as well as on
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